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Professor  Pangle's  essay  revolves  around  a  fairly  straightforward
narrative.  The period of classical  republicanism  placed a high premium
on virtue and responsibility;  its conception of freedom presupposed rule,
not license:  its rulers were to be chosen on the basis of wisdom and char-
acter;  it had  no real  place for rights.  The early  liberals, symbolized  by
Machiavelli, largely abandoned these commitments.  Seeing selfishness as
the usual motivating  force of human behavior, they  inaugurated  a  new
emphasis on rights, and they disparaged virtue.  The American founding,
influenced above all by the early liberals, reflected at most a diluted belief
in the republican commitments.  The framers' main goal was the protec-
tion of rights.  For them, self-interest was the ordinary motivating source
of human behavior.  American-style republicanism was egalitarian, liber-
tarian, and democratic;  it saw as its chief goal the protection  and foster-
ing of individual rights.  As time has gone on, the American  departure
from  republicanism  has  become  all  the  more  conspicuous,  and  also
troubling.  Its  consequences  have been  "the  shrinking of the spirit, the
shriveling of the  heart, the banalization  of existence,"  manifesting  itself
in an extraordinarily  wide array of social problems.
There  is undoubtedly  a great deal  that is true in Pangle's  account,
and we should all be grateful that a scholar of Pangle's learning and com-
mitment has chosen to devote himself to exploration of the role of repub-
lican  thought  in  the  American  constitutional  tradition.  In  this
Comment, I want to venture a few cautionary words about Pangle's nar-
rative.  My  basic concern  is that he may have  drawn the distinction be-
tween  liberalism  and  republicanism  a  bit too  sharply, in  a way  that is
perhaps  untrue to the amplitude  of America's liberal republicanism.
As Pangle emphasizes,  there is not one  "republicanism"  but many;
and it is no simple task to describe those features of republicanism  that
unite, say, Aristotle, Jefferson, Madison, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
But  the American  founders  were  insistent on their  republicanism,  and
they did not at all understand the term to be an antonym to those of their
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commitments that we would now describe as liberal.I  For the founders,
republicanism connoted a form of democratic self-determination;  a large
degree of deliberation  in government; political equality; and a belief that
political  outcomes  should  reflect  a  capacity  to  think  about  the public
good.2  The framers emphatically  rejected  the notion that self-interest  is
the inevitable  motivating  force  behind  human  behavior.  They did not
believe that reason was always  the slave of the passions.  They sought to
create a deliberative democracy  that was realistic about human  motiva-
tion but that sought simultaneously to encourage and provide a place for
virtue.
At least if stated at a certain level of generality, then, the republican
commitments of American constitutionalism  have a degree of continuity
with classical thought,  on which the framers drew  a great  deal.  It is  in
any  case  profitable  to  explore  the  ways  in  which  the  thought  of the
founding  period  shared characteristics  with classical  thought that have
been abandoned in such prominent modem approaches as interest-group
pluralism and contemporary neo-Lockeanism.  A large part of the value
of the modem revival of the republican tradition has been, not to displace
liberalism,  but to show that the American  tradition is inadequately  un-
derstood  by  those  who  see  the  framers  as  neopluralists  or  as  believers
above  all in a prepolitical  sphere of private  rights.
Moreover, the writing and ratification of the American Constitution
was not first and foremost a matter of protecting rights.  We might recall
here that the federalists  did not want  a bill of rights, and that the moti-
vating force behind the Constitution  was that the Articles of Confedera-
tion  were  ill-adapted  to  the  process  of republican  self-government.  In
arguing  for the  Constitution,  those  who favored  it did  not  exclusively
stress "rights"-which  is  not  to  say  that these  were  unimportant.  In-
stead they wanted to provide a government that could promote economic
prosperity and domestic  security,  and avoid the extraordinarily  difficult
conflicts that had characterized  life under  the Articles.
In  any  case,  the  American  founders  thought  that  their  belief  in
rights marched  hand-in-hand  with their republicanism;  and any form of
republicanism that is worthy of contemporary  support will have to place
a high premium on rights.  Like republicanism, the term "rights"  embod-
ies a widely disparate array of concerns.  It includes the vast panoply  of
claims that individual citizens, or groups, might  make against  the state:
1.  See  G.  Wood,  Classical  Republicanism  and the American  Revolution,  66  CHL-KErr L.
REv.  13  (1990).
2.  For a summary and  citations, see Sunstein, Beyond  the Republican  Revival,  97  YALE  L.J.
1539  (1988).
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freedom  from discrimination;  protections  of property  and contract;  pre-
vention of redistribution; rights of interstate mobility; political rights, in-
cluding  free  speech  and  political  participation;  rights  of  criminal
procedure;  welfare  rights; and so on.  Many of these  rights fit naturally
with republicanism  and are in no serious conflict with it.  Rights of free-
dom of speech, political association, and assembly are quite logical coun-
terparts of the republican commitments.  The right to a jury trial, with its
firm encouragement of citizenship, belongs in the same category.  So too
with the right of private property, furnishing a basic guarantee  of inde-
pendence  and  security,  a  check  against  arbitrary  government,  and  a
shield against the corruption of political activity through the sometimes
distorting effects  of interest.
Pangle is no doubt correct to emphasize the modernity of the notion
of rights as we use that term.  But I wonder if a republicanism of rights is
in fact "problematic"  or in the end even daring.  No doubt, some concep-
tions of rights would warrant this characterization.  It would be hard to
combine  republicanism with a rights-based  system that had no place for
deliberation in politics, that disparaged citizenship, or that was skeptical
that different  "preferences"  might  be  distinguishable  in terms  of their
consequences  for  the individual,  for  intermediate  organizations,  or  for
the state.  A system of rights is critical, but (and here I fully agree with
Pangle) it must not serve as a substitute for other values that rights sim-
ply  do not promote.  Nonetheless,  so long as we  define the category  of
rights in an appropriate  way, a republicanism  of rights  is likely to be a
fortunate alliance rather than an oxymoron or a crazy-quilt.  Indeed, the
American  system  has  functioned  best  when  it  has  adhered  simultane-
ously to its republicanism  and to its commitment to rights.
One final note.  Pangle's  wide-ranging  concluding  section seems to
me to collapse  ideas and problems that should  be distinguished.  There
are  of course  profound differences  among egalitarianism,  libertarianism,
and a commitment to popular sovereignty.  Indeed the three are conflict-
ing  creeds.  Libertarianism  cannot  always  coexist  with  popular  sover-
eignty, as the New Deal and Great Society periods (among many others)
demonstrated.  America's commitment to libertarianism  (as the libertari-
ans  themselves  stress) has been  at best intermittent.  Egalitarianism has
never been a crucial principle of American constitutionalism, and a belief
in egalitarianism, understood as equal distribution of resources, would be
entirely incompatible with beliefs in popular sovereignty and libertarian-
ism.  When Pangle suggests that American republicanism, or liberal prin-
ciples  about  the  social  contract,  are  founded  on  egalitarianism,
libertarianism,  and  popular  sovereignty,  I  find  myself wishing  that  he
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would say more about exactly what he thinks is entailed by these appar-
ently quite different  ideas.
There is much to be said, it seems to me,  in favor of Pangle's views
about the social problems with which he concludes.  He points to a wide
range of problems,  including decreasing  voting, dwindling interest in se-
rious  literature,  fascination  with brutal  and  sentimental  entertainment,
and  drug use.  On  all these  he is saying something  true and important.
But I wonder  whether he might not be tackling too much too quickly.  I
wonder to what extent a "dissolution  of relations between the sexes,"  an
"erosion of the supports in tradition, religion, and reason for shared ties
of reverence  and  meaning,"  and  "a  disconnectedness  between  genera-
tions"  have  actually  occurred,  and  whether  these  belong  at all  in  the
same category.  In any case I wonder about the precise relationships be-
tween these  phenomena on the one  hand and republicanism,  liberalism,
and rights on the other.  Surely these relationships are not simple or lin-
ear ones.  It would  be most interesting  for those concerned  about these
relationships  to deal with them in more detail in the future.
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